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In July 1994, in accordance with Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of
1986, the Clinton Administration published its first National Security Strategy. Entitled A National Security Strategy of
Engagement and Enlargement, the document formally articulated the US strategic objective of "protecting,
consolidating and enlarging the community of free market democracies" through an active yet selective US
engagement around the world.[1] Only through such a leadership role, it was argued, could the United States protect its
vital interests and promote stable, peaceful international relations.
The US military strategy in support of the national security strategy appeared in 1995 with the subtitle "A Strategy of
Flexible and Selective Engagement." This military strategy consists of three main components: "peacetime
engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fighting and winning our Nation's wars."[2] Peacetime
engagement is described further as including "military-to-military contacts, nation assistance, security assistance,
humanitarian operations, counterdrug and counterterrorism, and peacekeeping."[3] Peace enforcement as a military
operation is included under the second component, deterring aggression and preventing conflict.
It is clear from these two documents that current US strategy, both national security and military, entails a substantial
commitment to peace operations as a way in which to use our military resources in pursuit of our strategic objectives.
At this general level, the relationship between ends, ways, and means is clear enough. But the relationship becomes
considerably less clear as we press for more specificity, and as the range of possible military options under the heading
of peace operations expands. The purpose of this article is to examine US strategy, as it pertains to the use of peace
operations, with greater specificity.
The general argument presented here is that the development of an appropriate policy is based on a prior understanding
of the nature of the problem. As obvious as this statement is, evidence suggests that US strategy has not wholly come
to grips with it. The more specific argument of this article is that a general phenomenon (ungovernability), of
increasingly global proportions, is at work in the nation-state system of the late-20th century, and it gives rise to a host
of challenges for which it may at first appear that peace operations are an appropriate response. Yet a better
understanding of that phenomenon reveals that such peace operations, as presently conceived, are likely to fail in terms
of accomplishing strategic objectives. The search for a better understanding of the challenges and an appropriate
strategy for dealing with them begins with a brief discussion of the democratization component of our national security
strategy. It is followed by a section on "failed states." The article then turns to some of the reasons underlying these
failures and to a more general discussion of the phenomenon of ungovernability. Finally, it concludes with a discussion
of the implications of ungovernability and failed states for our national security strategy of engagement and
enlargement and the peace operations component of the national military strategy that supports it.
The Strategy: Democratization
The US post-Cold War strategy of engagement and enlargement began with public pronouncements in the last year of
the Bush Administration and then was formally articulated under President Clinton. Fundamentally based on the
premise of the "democratic peace" (democracies do not go to war with other democracies), this strategy entails the
active promotion and expansion of the community of democratic, free-market countries as a way of applying national
resources toward the pursuit of strategic objectives.[4] In theory the strategy meshes very well with two basic US
interests. First, it is consistent with the goal of promoting values, among which democracy and market economies are

certainly key. Second, it implies the ability to reduce the risks of confrontation through the use of a variety of
instruments, not just military, and with a number of approaches short of the United States' acting as "global
policeman," which leads to crisis response through multilateral, multinational, and collective security arrangements. In
practice the strategy has generated serious discussions and perplexing problems, not the least of which is deciding on
the appropriate instruments with which to promote democracy, and the level of commitment which the United Nations,
the United States, and other countries are willing to support in order to succeed.
The debate has centered somewhat on the appropriateness of the objectives--should the United States really be
concerned about the internal affairs of other countries, and should it be actively engaged in promoting democratic
forms of governance--but the primary focus has been on the instruments, especially the use of the military. Initially,
there was considerable optimism about the use of the military to promote peaceful transitions to democracy. The ways
in which the military means could be used fell under the umbrella heading of Peace Operations.[5] Somalia, however,
brought an abrupt end to the prevailing optimism. Problems of "mission creep," command and control for UN
operations, and the overall feasibility and desirability of using US military personnel for the purpose of promoting
democracy through peace operations all came together in a debate that led to a complete rethinking of the ways and
means to support the strategy. One of the main results of this rethinking was Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD
25), a kind of "Weinberger Doctrine" applied to peace operations. Much more cautious, this policy seemed to define a
significantly narrower range of actions for the military in support of democratization. But with the relative success of
the Haiti operation (with success defined as avoiding a military disaster, such as significant numbers of US casualties),
some balance was restored to the underlying strategy.
The central question remains, however: To what extent, and in what ways, can the US military be used effectively in
the promotion of the US strategy of democratization? The answer to this question lies less with the military and its
capabilities than with the nature of the problem and the appropriate ways and means for dealing with it. The balance of
this article will focus on analyzing the nature of the problem and assessing military peace operations as a tool for
addressing it. To understand the problem more fully, one must consider the failed state.
The Problem: Failed States
Among the many significant developments in the post-Cold War international system, the failed state is a relatively
new phenomenon. Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner describe the failed nation-state as "utterly incapable of sustaining
itself as a member of the international community."[6] A list of such failed (or at least faltering) nation-states today
would include Haiti, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Lebanon, the Sudan, Liberia, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia,
Zaire, and the former Soviet Union. William Olson suggests that the list could be easily expanded if one were to
include states facing serious "internal problems that threaten their continued coherence" or "significant internal
challenges to their political order."[7] No matter how one looks at the phenomenon, it is growing both in scope and in
the potential detrimental consequences it entails for stability and security in the post-Cold War world.
The fundamental problem of failed states is that they do not simply go away, they linger; the longer they persist, the
greater the potential challenges to neighboring states, regional stability, and international peace. In 1992 Boutros
Boutros-Ghali addressed the issue in his discussion of the reduced significance of sovereignty in the post-Cold War
world and the concomitant possibility that the UN would be compelled to intervene in the domestic affairs of member
states. He suggested that such intervention would be appropriate in the face of a collapse of domestic governing
authority, displaced populations or gross violations of human rights, or when developments within the failed state
posed a threat to international peace and stability.[8] Helman and Ratner observe that failed states threaten neighboring
countries because civil strife, economic collapse, and the breakdown of food and health systems "force refugees to flee
to adjacent countries." These states may also "be burdened with illicit arms traffic, solidarity activities by related
ethnic groups, and armed bands seeking to establish a safe haven." There is also a "tangible risk that such conflicts will
spill over into other countries."[9] In other words, the problems frequently do not remain neatly contained within the
boundaries of the failed state. Brian Atwood, head of the Agency for International Development, observed that
"disintegrating societies and failed states . . . have emerged as the greatest menace to global stability," and he considers
them a "strategic threat."[10]
In addition to these general threats to stability and security, a failed or failing state is itself a potential target for

internal or external disruption and insurgencies. A transnational or sub-state actor, operating either within the troubled
country or from points nearby, may seek to exploit conditions in order to promote its own agenda. Such activities
could lead to the destabilization of an entire region, thereby quickly escalating into a security threat well beyond the
relatively minor interests originating from the failed or failing state. These states also provide an environment in which
such actors can thrive, exploiting the lack of effective governance to build their resources. So, for example, the
inability of a state to control criminal activities such as drug or weapons smuggling, money laundering, and terrorism
may eventually transform the country into a kind of "safe haven" from which the criminal can effectively consolidate
and expand operations. To the extent that such actors gain strength in these safe havens, the failed state becomes a
security concern for other countries, including the United States.
Failed states are also problematic because they frequently generate significant and highly visible violations of human
rights.[11] The pain and suffering of large numbers of refugees, especially children, make for compelling photojournalism, and the examples of Somalia and Bosnia come readily to mind. Similarly, people suffering under the chaos
and near-anarchy of a collapsing government, or the brutal authoritarianism of an autocratic regime desperately trying
to maintain its weakened ruling position, appear to most of the world's audience as innocent victims deserving of
serious outside assistance (Haiti, Rwanda). There are at least two relevant dimensions to this aspect of the problem.
First, humanitarian interests are one of the three categories of national interests considered central to US national
security strategy.[12] As such, visible examples of human rights violations will quickly raise questions concerning the
extent to which the United States is in fact being true to its own stated security strategy, or whether (as has been
argued from time to time) the United States only selectively supports human rights (i.e., when it's convenient).
Closely related to this is the second dimension of the problem, namely the public outcry that generally accompanies
such highly visible cases of human rights violations. The outcry, often fed by the extensive media coverage that such
crises engender (as well as by the efforts of involved groups to generate sympathy, support, and revenue), increases
domestic and international pressures to "do something."[13] Such pressures can all too easily lead to responses that are
less than carefully thought out in advance. The point is simply that these human rights dimensions of failed states, by
their very nature, raise critical issues for the United States in terms of our national security strategy and our ability to
be selective and effective in responding to them.
Why are states failing? Much of the failed-state phenomenon has its origins in the collapse of the colonial order that
followed World War II. That conflict unleashed a wave of independence movements, and the end of the Cold War has
now allowed the process to continue.[14] The scope of this transformation is evident in the raw numbers: In 1945, 50
countries signed the United Nations Charter; today there are 185 members of that international organization. Yet while
there can be little doubt that the explosion in the number of actors seeking to fulfill their destinies by achieving
"statehood" is the precipitating event in the rise of failed states, this does not yet explain why they are failing.
Part of the explanation lies in the international policies that greeted these emerging states more than 40 years ago and
which continue to greet them well into this most recent wave. Stressing self-determination as the preeminent value, the
UN (and indeed most Western nations) seemed quite content to ignore questions of the long-term economic and
political viability of an emerging state. Whether such a country could govern itself effectively or even sustain itself
economically mattered rather little. Former colonial powers frequently provided economic assistance with no clear
strategy for developing mature governing capabilities in the former colonial states.[15] The Cold War competition only
added to the problem as the two camps competed for influence and "victories" by providing military and economic aid,
thereby propping up not only weak but often wholly corrupt regimes in the name of their ideological cause. Here, too,
no strategy existed for promoting viable, let alone democratic political and market economic institutions and processes.
The result, after 40 years of post-colonialism and a protracted Cold War, was an entire class of countries with only
marginal capacities to function politically and economically.
In addition to adding a number of new members to this group of troubled and failing states, the end of the Cold War
had another devastating effect on many of these countries. Deprived of economic assistance that flowed from the EastWest confrontation, many were plunged headlong into a crisis that had been brewing for years but which few leaders
(at home and abroad) anticipated. Beset by corruption, ineffective institutions, and weak political culture, often facing
internal opposition and ethnic or religious fragmentation, many of these countries are now staggering into the next
century. And as if the failed policies and programs of the past were not enough, some of these already faltering states

were hit by natural disasters, ranging from floods and droughts to famine and pestilence.[16]
Another important factor in the failed state phenomenon is, somewhat ironically, the "democratic moment."[17]
Occurring with, and in part a cause of, the emergence of many "neo-states," the end of the Cold War ushered in a
period in which the global preference for democratic forms of governance was overwhelming. On virtually every
continent neo-states were emerging as neo-democracies. In many respects this was not so much a matter of choice as a
matter of necessity; after all, in this "democratic moment" what else was a country to be? While few would argue
against the desirability of democracy generally, it is important to maintain some sense of perspective on the specific
challenges that confront this type of political system. For example, by virtue of emphasizing individual rights and
freedoms, democracies tend not to be very "strong." Even the most advanced democracies are continually seeking that
proper balance between freedom and authority. And this challenge is even more acute in neo-democracies, where
threats to survival may be severe and the norms and values of a democratic civil society often weak or nonexistent. In
periods of transition such as we now have in the post-colonial, post-Cold War world, characterized by tremendous
social, political, and economic upheaval, relatively weak democratic institutions and processes can easily fall prey to
the forces of uncertainty and fear, especially when there are indigenous actors ready, willing, and able to exploit
human emotions for the sake of redirecting or killing democratic reforms.
The recognition of these challenges leads to an all-too-often overlooked paradox in the democratic peace argument that
undergirds contemporary economic and political liberalism, including the US strategy of engagement and
enlargement.[18] While it may be true that mature democracies do not go to war with other democracies, it is highly
questionable whether this statement applies equally to "immature" democracies.[19] Moreover, it seems that in the
period of transition from autocratic, authoritarian regimes to democracy, the propensity of states to go to war may
actually increase.[20] This paradox points out that the end state of mature democracy may be attainable only after a
high-risk transition phase through neo- (and immature) democracy. More democracies may eventually lead to greater
international peace and stability, but the process of enlarging the community of democracies may be very destabilizing
and fraught with conflict. Although there are many interesting aspects of this issue to explore, for the purposes of this
article it suffices to point out that the current situation in which the number of failed and faltering states is increasing
may itself be partly a result of the "democratic moment." Attempts to expand democracies may have the unintended,
deleterious consequence of expanding the community of failed or failing states.
To this point the argument has been that factors accounting for failing states grow out of the colonial and post-colonial
heritage, systemic changes resulting from the end of the Cold War, and attempts by newly emerging countries to adopt
democratic forms of governance. But an even broader phenomenon may be at work in the nation-state system today:
increasing ungovernability. The process by which formal governmental authority is rendered increasingly ineffective is
potentially more threatening than the isolated failure of specific states, for it suggests that the problems we see today
are not simply the result of pre-existing historical conditions, but of ongoing developments associated with today's
post-industrial, global society. A brief examination of ungovernability is therefore a necessary component of this
analysis.
The Problem Expanded: Ungovernability
Ungovernability has been defined as "the declining ability of governments worldwide, but particularly in the Third
World, to govern, to carry out the many and various responsibilities of managing a modern state in an increasingly
complex environment."[21] The phenomenon manifests itself in a variety of ways. Battles rage to redefine borders and
territory in the post-Cold War world. Some countries, such as the former Yugoslavia, have collapsed into civil war and
ethnic strife. Others, such as Somalia, have fallen prey to criminal elements, with society characterized by "warlordism" and a pervasive sense of chaos and anarchy.[22] Still others, such as Haiti, comprise a third category of
troubled state: those that are simply exhausted. States in this category are characterized not so much by civil war or
rampant criminality as by a sweeping sense of despair and hopelessness.
At the same time, events in 1995 suggested that mature democratic states are also subject to threats emanating from
increasing ungovernability. In Japan the activities of the Aum Shinrikyo shook domestic tranquillity. In Paris daily life
was shattered by terrorist activities seemingly beyond the control of French authorities. In the United States, the
Oklahoma City bombing called Americans' attention to the vulnerability we all share in the modern world, while the

activities of unauthorized paramilitary organizations such as survivalists and private "militias" raise serious questions
about individual and group rights versus the public rights of domestic security and tranquillity. A London trader
operating out of Singapore single-handedly managed to ruin a major British financial institution, and call into question
the security of the entire international financial system.[23] And a computer hacker on the FBI's most-wanted list was
arrested in North Carolina, but not before he demonstrated to the world the relative ease with which a knowledgeable
individual might be able to bring business and government to their knees with some well-designed computer sabotage.
A study being conducted by the National Strategy Information Center suggests there are three main components to the
problem of increasing global ungovernability. First, there is the growth of transnational organized crime. Criminal
elements have expanded their reach, upgraded and perfected their methods of operation, and increasingly established
links that cut across borders and entire regions of the globe.[24] Second, the explosive resurgence and growth of
ethnic and religious conflicts have fueled the pressures toward further fragmentation within countries. Moreover, the
apparent intractability of ethnic and religious differences contributes to the "erosion of effective government and of
public confidence in government."[25] Third, general trends and developments in economic and financial markets, and
the pervasive influence of technology, have also eroded the effectiveness (both real and perceived) of formal
governments to perform those tasks essential to the orderly functioning of society.[26] All three components help
explain why ungovernability is increasing today.
Although an analysis of this explanation is beyond the scope of this article, a brief overview sheds some light on the
problem addressed here. First, the changes in the international system discussed earlier provide part of the explanation.
The end of colonialism and the end of the Cold War have provided a growing number of weak, failing, or failed states
in which formal authorities compete with a variety of opposition forces (both organized and informal).
Second, incredible advances in technology have induced profound change in the ways in which people organize and
conduct business, politics, and a host of human activities. Communications technology was in no small part
responsible for the demise of many centralized political and economic regimes; it simply became impossible to control
information and ideas, and to manage political and economic intercourse within highly centralized and hierarchical
systems. Subnational, transnational, and decentralized groups (such as the organized crime, ethnic, and religious
groups discussed above) can now compete with many formal governments for the loyalties of individuals.[27]
Developments in weapon technologies have further empowered such groups, providing them with the improved means
to wage war against formal government authority and to conduct devastating terrorist campaigns against innocent
populations designed to erode their faith in and support of their governments. And some of the technologies, by their
very design, are nearly impossible for governments to monitor and control.
Third, economic changes also have played a significant role in increasing ungovernability. The globalization of the
world economy and financial markets, in part a result of the application of modern communications and information
technologies, has opened up borders and limited the effectiveness of national economic policies in ameliorating
domestic problems. The widening gap between the haves and the have-nots, both within and across countries, has
provided fertile soil for sowing seeds of dissatisfaction and fostering a search for simple alternatives. The latter,
unfortunately, often have even more devastating consequences than the problems they were intended to solve.
The combination of all three factors in various forms contributes to the ongoing problems confronting troubled or
failed states. The already weak governmental mechanisms bump up against a world that is increasingly less amenable
to domestic policy control. The economy that was not working very well to begin with suddenly finds itself in
competition with other economies all over the world. Because of the overlapping and interweaving of economies, the
negative performance of one or two large economies may have serious consequences for many smaller, otherwise
healthy economies.[28] All of this combines to erode further citizens' confidence in government. So in a state already
failing, ungovernability may magnify the problems that are causing it to fail in the first place, such as ethnic
fragmentation. As one study notes, "Frustrated by the inability of governments to help, people may turn away from the
sovereign state and embrace smaller, more effective groups. Thus, fragmentation pressures are often related to the
decreasing ability of the state to respond to its citizens' needs."[29]
Groups that wish to oppose the government, or to mobilize people against it, have many more tools available to them
to do so. They also have many more examples of governmental failure and shortcomings as a result of the increasing

numbers of problems that are less susceptible to domestic governmental manipulation. Moreover, the "CNN Age" and
its related technologies virtually guarantee that those failures and shortcomings will be easily and quickly seen
throughout the failing state and its neighbors.
What does the foregoing discussion suggest about the nature of the problem confronting US security interests in this
era of failed states and increasing global ungovernability? First, it suggests that the problem goes beyond the existence
of post-colonial and post-Cold War weak states. Although many of the problems confronting these states stem directly
from their historical lack of effective economic and political institutions and processes, they are magnified by much
larger forces at work today on all countries in the international system. Even if short-term fixes could be found for the
vestiges of the past, there would be no guarantees that these countries could perform at levels sufficient for building
and sustaining public support and legitimacy. Second, it suggests that even the best US efforts will encounter
limitations, both in the target country (where otherwise successful policies may not ameliorate enough of the problem)
and in the United States (where policy options will also be limited by global constraints).[30] It is, in sum, a very
difficult time for governments of all types, but especially troublesome for fledgling democracies. At a time when
democratization is to be a cornerstone of US national security strategy, the forces of ungovernability, combined with
the characteristics of failing states, provide a daunting challenge to that strategy.
The Ways: Peacekeeping Operations
As the number of failed or faltering states was increasing, the end of the Cold War brought a revived sense of
optimism about the role of the United Nations in promoting and preserving global security. After all, it was the EastWest confrontation that had rendered most of Chapter VII moot for 45 years, and peacekeeping itself had emerged as a
kind of "Chapter 6 1/2" response to the requirements of protecting international security in the absence of great power
cooperation in a system of collective security.[31] Because states all too often continued their attempts to resolve
disputes in ways other than "pacific settlement" (Chapter VI), and because true "collective enforcement" of the peace
(Chapter VII) proved impossible in the context of extreme East-West tensions, so-called "traditional" peacekeeping
simply evolved to fill the gap in UN ability to respond to crises.
This Cold War peacekeeping had some very clear ground rules and distinctive characteristics. Among them were:
consent of all local parties to the conflict, especially the host nation; impartiality of the peacekeeping forces; no "great
power" (defined as permanent members of the Security Council) contribution to the forces; limited mission (to monitor
an existing peace treaty); and use of force for self-defense only. The idea was that such forces could assist in
promoting peace by serving essentially as referees to control the manner in which the game was played, but without
interfering in ways that might cross over into the superpowers' zero-sum game.[32] It is fair to say that this kind of
peacekeeping achieved a significant number of successes during its time.
Given this background, it is not surprising that the end of the Cold War initially spawned optimism that the UN could
extend its peacekeeping functions to a much broader range of conflicts. The successful resolution of the Gulf Crisis,
albeit with the use of overwhelming military force and the "law of war,"[33] only reinforced the optimism, as reflected
in such public pronouncements as Boutros-Ghali's "An Agenda for Peace" and even then-President George Bush's
"New World Order." At least two assumptions underlay those views. First, the UN would finally be able to realize its
full potential as a collective security organization. Chapter VII of the UN Charter, heretofore dormant, could now be
utilized in its fullest and truest sense. Second, Cold War peacekeeping could be adapted and applied to a much wider
range of situations, and great power involvement in them would no longer be prohibited. With both broader consensus
and great power (i.e., US) military force, peacekeeping could be expanded to include peace enforcement, peace
building, and the like.[34] In other words, the full range of peace operations could be employed to forge international
security and stability. The "New World Order" could be a reality.
But the optimism was rather short-lived. Subtly but importantly, peacekeeping began to take on a new set of
characteristics and ground rules. Consent of the parties was viewed as desirable but no longer necessary. Impartiality
was similarly softened; a just cause made up for the lack of complete impartiality. Great power involvement, especially
US, was almost required, not prohibited. And in places where peace among adversaries, however fragile, did not exist,
it could be made (by force, if necessary) and then enforced. Not surprising, the UN and the United States saw their
hopes dashed. For different reasons, the defining moments occurred in Somalia, which came to symbolize the failure

of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War world. The backlash is still being felt as the wave of "lessons learned" is
translated into new national policy guidelines for multilateral peace operations. Carefully circumscribing not only
conditions under which they would participate but also the processes for arriving at decisions to participate, countries
like the United States began to pull back from the activist roles that had seemed so natural only two years earlier.[35]
Other countries soon followed suit.[36] It is fair to say that the world has reached a serious crossroads in the evolution
of peace operations, and it is time to rethink the issues and the approaches with an eye toward developing a strategy.
To be effective, that strategy must first and foremost begin with a proper understanding of the nature of the challenges.
Peace Operations, Failed States, and Ungovernability
In a thoughtful and provocative article published in 1992, John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra described the need for
what they called a "second generation" of UN military operations to deal with the new challenges.[37] They outlined a
continuum of operations ranging from "conventional observer missions" on the low end of the intensity spectrum to
full-scale "enforcement" on the high end. In the new operational environment, shifts among and across the types of
operations can occur on a continual basis, so operational flexibility is necessitated.[38] Moreover, unlike Cold War
peacekeeping, where success was "largely dictated by the effectiveness of the preceding political agreement between
the parties and not by the capabilities of the military force," effectiveness of military force is much more critical to
second-generation operations, especially at the higher end of the intensity spectrum.[39] They go on to argue, quite
reasonably, that there are some important lessons to be learned for such operations from the British Commonwealth
armies' efforts at "keeping the peace" during decolonization. Such operations were focused on internal conflicts and
violence, and the efforts were often directed at restoring and maintaining order. In other words, the conflicts then
looked a lot like the conflicts of today, and contemporary peace operations need to be tailored to meet similar
requirements.
There are, of course, some problems with their arguments and especially recommendations.[40] However, they have
touched on an important issue, namely the nature of the conflicts with which the UN is confronted. The post-Somalia
debate focused overwhelmingly on the "mission creep" issue and the way in which the operation shifted from
humanitarian to peacekeeping to enforcement. The distinction between Chapter VI and Chapter VII was blurred,
according to this argument, and therein lies the reason for the ultimate failure of the operation. While this assessment
of the symptoms is correct, it fails to address the true cause of the failure. The operation failed first and foremost
because it was based on a faulty understanding of the nature of the conflict. Somalia was a failed state, and it should
have been addressed as such from the very beginning. The humanitarian crisis to which we were responding was a
result of the failed state and ungovernability; the state was not failing because of the humanitarian crisis.
Understanding the nature of the problem would lead to the recognition of some obvious characteristics of failed and
failing states beset by problems of ungovernability and the implications for peace support operations. First, because
failed states typically lack effective governance, serious questions arise about consent of the parties to the conflict.
Moreover, in such an environment it may be difficult to discern just who the parties to the conflict are. The cast of
characters may ebb and flow as the conflict unfolds. Similarly, there are likely to be real problems with command and
control for the parties to the conflict; one might obtain "consent" only to find that the leaders who offered it have no
effective means of implementing and enforcing that consent down the line. Second, impartiality may be desirable in
theory, but in this environment it may be impossible to maintain because some actors will be motivated to tear down
whatever institutions and processes of governance exist. By being enemies of everything, they will make it extremely
difficult for a peace support force to be impartial; if the force is there simply to restore order, those who favor disorder
will not see it as impartial.[41] Third, great power military force (state-of-the-art, efficient, professional, and so on)
may be completely irrelevant. This may be true through no fault of the military force; rather, the underlying problem
may not be amenable to any military solution. Finally, the human rights and humanitarian problems evident in such
crises are probably the result of the crisis of governability, and until that crisis is resolved or ameliorated, no amount of
external intervention (military or otherwise) will do anything to ease the problems except at the margins.
What is really needed in such cases is not just improved operational capabilities, clearer rules of engagement, a known
end state, and an exit strategy. What is needed is a much broader strategy for addressing ungovernability and the
process of building democratic nation-states. A strategy for dealing with failed states must include a prescription for
"curing what fails it," and this essentially requires a comprehensive strategy for building effective governance first, and

effective democracy second. Research suggests that this can only be done over the long term, focusing on developing
civil society, attitudes, and norms of behavior, not just institutions and elections. A sound military strategy in support
of that broad strategy of democratization is certainly necessary, but it can be effective only if it is one component of a
strategy that involves all of the relevant dimensions of power. The ways and means for preventing ungovernability and
achieving democracy must at least include, and probably be most firmly anchored in, political, economic, and sociopsychological power.
The contemporary situation suggests that unlike Cold War UN peacekeeping, which occurred for the most part in
conflicts that were inter-state and involved strong states, post-Cold War peace operations will most likely occur within
weak, failed, or failing states, in a context of increasing ungovernability. If not embedded in a broader strategy of
democratization, military operations in these contexts will fail; they will either fail in theater as a military operation, or
they will fail as part of the broader strategy when the conflict resumes as soon as the military is withdrawn. A broader
strategy of democratization will also help in the careful selection of those instances where a military response is
warranted and where it has a reasonable chance of success. After all, if one cannot conclude that the objective of a
functioning, democratic state is at least somewhat attainable, then it makes absolutely no sense to undertake a military
peace support operation.[42]
Peace operations in the kind of environment discussed here, in which the basic elements of effective governance are
absent or severely weakened, are no easy undertaking. Human rights violations will be plentiful, and humanitarian
concerns heightened. Not only will these issues affect the choice of instrument used in addressing the crisis, they will
also affect the environment in which the military operates.[43] By failing to address up front the precise nature of the
underlying causes of the conflict, and thereby determining what, if anything, can be done to resolve it, decisions to
undertake military peace support operations will almost certainly lead to failure of the policies and potentially tragic
consequences. A strategy of democratization must reflect an understanding of the challenges of ungovernability lest
the pursuit of the former lead only to the proliferation of the latter. Future military peace support operations must be
guided by a broader national security strategy for confronting ungovernability and building stable, functioning
democracies.
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